Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies by Finn, John J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 11
1-1-1969
Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A
Conflict of Policies
John J. Finn
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and
Arbitration Commons
This Student Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John J. Finn, Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C.L. Rev. 406
(1969), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol10/iss2/11
PRIVATE ARBITRATION AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT:
A CONFLICT OF POLICIES
"Commercial arbitration is unquestionably a highly regarded method
for private and expeditious settlement of business disputes. . . . However, its
use with respect to antitrust matters has been controversial in the United
States, where the idea of free competition is firmly imbedded in the federal
antitrust concept."' In two recent cases, one in ,the United States Court of
Appeals involving federal law, 2 the other in the New York Court of Appeals
involving New York law,'" this controversy was confronted. The question of
the appropriateness of arbitration as a forum for the consideration of par-
ticular statutory issues has arisen a number of times. 4 The leading case
framing the question is Wilko v. Swan, where the United States Court of
Appeals stated:
. Mlle remedy a statute provides for violation of the statutory
right it creates may be sought not only in any "court of competent
jurisdiction" but also in any other competent tribunal, such as arbi-
tration, unless the right itself is of a character inappropriate for
enforcement by arbitration...
.''
In that case the Court of Appeals decided that arbitration is a competent
tribunal for protection of the individual investor's statutory rights under the
United States Securities Act. The Supreme Court reversed, however, constru-
ing the non-waiver provision of the Securities Act as prohibiting the investor
from waiving his statutory rights to judicial trial and review. 6 In the two
principal cases, American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,' and
1 Von Wartburg, Commercial Arbitration and Antitrust Matters in the European
Economic Community, 21 Arb. J. (n.s.) 65 (1966). See this article generally for a dis-
cussion of how the same concerns facing the courts in the principal cases confronted
the European Economic Community with the advent of the Common Market. "In Europe,
where unlimited competition seldom was regarded as the only policy fostering an efficient
economy, arbitral tribunals were more readily attributed the power to decide matters of
restrictive trade regulation. . . . I Flree competition as a publicly promoted and officially
enforced safeguard of the growth of the Common Market . . . calls for a re-examination
of the role of arbitral tribunals . . . , with special regard to their competence in antitrust
litigation." Id.
2 American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968),
rev'g 271 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. La. 1966).
g Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods,, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223,
289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
4 In Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1966) (Bankruptcy Act) ; United States
ex rd. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1966), petition for cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 924 (1966) (Miller Act) ; and Evans v. Hud-
son Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948) (Fair Labor Standards Act), arbitration of
statutory claims was approved. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, rev'g 201 F.2d 439 (2d
Cir. 1953) (Securities Act) ; Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 141
(W.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1963) (determination of status of patent);
and Kingswood Management Corp. v. Salzman, 272 App. Div. 328, 70 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947)
(Emergency Price Control Act of 1942), statutory claims were held to be non-arbitrable.
5 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1953).
6 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
7 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tamar Prods., Inc.,8 the respective courts found
no explicit statutory bar to arbitration in the federal and New York antitrust
statutes but ruled, nevertheless, that for reasons of public policy antitrust
claims are "of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration."
These cases, then, have apparently resolved the controversy.
T. THE CASES
In American Safety Equipment plaintiff-appellant, American Safety
Equipment Corporation (ASE), and defendant-appellee, Hickok Manufactur-
ing Company, were parties to a license agreement under which Hickok
granted to ASE an exclusive license to use the "Hickok" trademarks in con-
nection with "safety protective devices" and "accessories." The license agree-
ment contained a broad arbitration clause which provided:
All controversies, disputes and claims of whatsoever nature and
description arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement and the
performance or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in
New York State in accordance with the laws of the State of New
York and the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration
Association. Any award rendered in such arbitration shall be final
and binding upon the parties and judgment may be rendered thereon
by any court having jurisdiction. 9
• After a falling out between the parties, ASE filed complaints in the district
court against Hickok and J.P. Maguire & Co., the claimed assignee of Hickok's
royalty rights, seeking declaratory judgments that the license agreement was
illegal and void ab initio and that no royalty obligations had or would accrue
under it. The complaints alleged that several provisions of the agreement
violated the Sherman Act" because they unlawfully extended Hickok's
trademark monopoly and unreasonably restricted ASE's business. Hickok
and Maguire invoked the arbitration clause, Maguire demanding arbitration
of a claim for royalties due and Hickok demanding arbitration of all issues.
Both defendants moved to stay ASE's declaratory judgment actions pending
arbitration. Subsequently ASE moved for preliminary injunctions against
arbitration. ASE's motions were denied and the two declaratory judgment
actions were stayed pending arbitration. Arbitration was directed with respect
to all claims, disputes and controversies between the parties relating to the
license agreement, including the issue as to the validity thereof." The court
held that the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the claims of
antitrust violations and found no public policy against referring them to
arbitration.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that antitrust claims are
inappropriate for arbitration because of the pervasive public interest in en-
forcement of the antitrust laws and the nature of the claims that arise in such
8 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
9 Brief for Appellee Hickok at 6, American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
11 391 F.2d at 823-24.	 •
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cases. The court reasoned that, in view of the potential magnitude of the
public injury stemming from antitrust violations, it was hardly likely that
Congress intended such claims to be resolved elsewhere than in the courts, nor
the forum for trying antitrust violations to be determined by contracts of
adhesion between alleged monopolists and their customers. In addition, the
court felt that arbitration procedures, appropriate for the business solutions
of problems, are inadequate for what are often complex antitrust issues re-
quiring extensive and diverse evidence.
In Aimcee plaintiff-appellant Aimcee had purchased some $100,000 in
merchandise from defendant-appellee Tomar. The contract, a form purchase
order, contained the following broad arbitration clause:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract
or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in New York
City, New York in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered may be entered in the highest court of the Forum, State or
Federal, having jurisdiction. 12
Aimcee sought arbitration both of its claim that merchandise shipped was
defective and that advertising allowances bad not been paid and also of
Tomar's suit against Aimcee in the New York Supreme Court for breach of
the agreement. Tomar agreed to arbitration but interposed a counterclaim
asserting that Aimcee had unlawfully exacted a discriminatory price reduction
in violation of both the Robinson-Patman Act 15 and the New York Donnelly
Act.14 Tomar asked $15,000 in treble damages. Aimcee moved for an order
staying arbitration of this counterclaim. Tomar consented to the stay with
respect to the alleged violation of federal law but resisted the stay as to the
Donnelly Act claim. The supreme court denied Aimcee's application on
the basis that the antitrust claim was related to the contract and was, there-
fore, arbitrable. The appellate division affirmed on the ground that there was
no challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement and that hence any
particular claim arising out of the parties' contract was arbitrable./ 5
The New York Court of Appeals reversed' 6 on the ground that com-
mercial arbitration was inappropriate for consideration of problems involving
the state's antitrust policy. According to the court, judicial control of anti-
trust controversies is an essential part of the statutory scheme. To allow the
submission of such controversies to private arbitration, where the courts
12 Brief for Appellant at 2, Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2cl
621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
13 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a-c, 21(a) (1964).
14 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340 (McKinney 1968).
15 26 App. Div. 915, 274 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1966). If Tomar had claimed that the agree-
ment was invalid because of antitrust violations that issue would have been a question
for the court. In New York when a contract is challenged on the ground of illegality
because in violation of a statute or of the public policy of the State, as distinguished
from common law illegality, the validity of the contract is a threshold question for the
courts, not one for the arbitrators. Durst v. Abrash, 22 App. Div. 2d 39, aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d
445 (1965). However, if Tomar had challenged the validity of the agreement, it would
have lacked any basis for its demand for arbitration.
16 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
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would have no say in the results reached, would dilute the judicial safeguards
provided in the Donnelly Act, enhance the likelihood of erroneous decisions
to the detriment of the public in general, severely diminish the deterrent
effect of the law on antitrust violations and enable antitrust violators to
insulate themselves from judicial scrutiny.
American Safety Equipment and Aimcee are the first two cases to have
decided the precise issue of the appropriateness of arbitration for the resolu-
tion of antitrust issues. Previous cases involving the question of the arbitra-
bility of antitrust issues were decided on other grounds.17 The courts in the
principal cases were concerned with whether, in cases where the arbitration
agreement between the parties is broad enough to cover antitrust claims and
where the question of the validity of the arbitration agreement does not serve
to bar submission of the dispute to arbitration,i 8 public policy prohibits the
submission to private arbitration of antitrust issues arising in the context
of a contract dispute otherwise subject to arbitration. The problem arises
from what the court in American Safety Equipment sees as a "clash of com-
peting fundamental policies." 19 The result of the present decisions is to delay
arbitration ptoceedings until judicial resolution of the antitrust issues which
often involve complicated and protracted litigation. Such a result apparently
frustrates federal and state policies encouraging arbitration as a "prompt,
economical and adequate solution of controversies."" A stay of arbitration,
17 In Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink Baking Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) and Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y.
1952), rev'd on other grounds, 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953), it was held that the antitrust
claims were outside the scope of the arbitration agreements. Both cases were initiated as
private treble damage suits and the courts found that the parties did not intend such
claims to be arbitrated. In City Trade & Indus., Ltd. v. New Central Jute Mills Co.,
(S. Ct. N.Y., Special Term) 1967 Trade Cas. Q 72,197, and Standardbred Owners Ass'n v.
Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 31 Misc. 2d 474, 220 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1961), it was held that the
claims of illegality of the agreements based on antitrust violations were for the courts.
See note 15 supra. In Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681
(S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960), the court refused to stay
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement even though the plaintiffs claimed
that the agreement violated the Sherman Act, on the ground that the antitrust claim was
not substantial and therefore a stay of arbitration was not warranted.
18 In Aimcee the validity of the agreement was not challenged (see note 15 supra)
and thus the question was not present. If the question had been raised the court would
have had to decide the antitrust issues in order to determine the validity of the agreement.
In federal courts the question of the validity of the contract containing the arbitration
clause is not generally for the courts. "[A] federal court may consider only issues relating
to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). Thus in American Safety Equipment
the court did not withdraw the entire question of the validity of the license agreement
and the arbitration clause from the arbitrators. It pointed out that, even if the contested
provisions of the agreement were found invalid because they were in violation of the
antitrust laws, the question of the validity of the remaining parts of the agreement,
including the arbitration clause, remained by virtue of their possible severability. Again, if
a finding of antitrust violations were made by the court, the questions remain whether
ASE is estopped from challenging the validity of the agreement since it has retained its
benefits, and whether the antitrust violations can be a defense to a claim for royalties
already due on goods sold under the terms of the agreement.
19 391 F.2d at 826.
20 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
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furthermore, has previously been termed "drastic relief," even where antitrust
issues were involved." As Mr. Justice Fortas stated in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., the plain meaning of the arbitration statute and
the unmistakably clear congressional purpose was that "the arbitration pro-
cedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject
to delay and obstruction in the courts." 22
 This basic purpose has led to the
judicial determination that when there is doubt as to whether a matter is a
proper subject of arbitration, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion.23
 In view of this apparent frustration of a legislatively favored public
policy it is important to determine whether the public interest justifies the
result reached in American Safety Equipment and Aimcee. This question
requires examination of the public purpose of statutory grants of a private
right to sue under antitrust laws, the provisions enacted to fulfill that purpose,
the conflicting purpose and procedures of arbitration laws and the potential
effect of the arbitration of antitrust issues on antitrust enforcement.
II. PRIVATE ARBITRATION AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Private arbitration was designed as an instrument for the resolution
of private business disputes. Private antitrust claims involve more than the
resolution of the conflicting private interests of parties to such disputes;
they require the interpretation and application of the public policy embodied
in federal and state antitrust laws. Because this policy is one of major im-
portance, the courts in the principal cases found it to be essential that they
concern themselves with the effect that arbitration of the private antitrust
claims facing them would have on the implementation of antitrust policy.
The antitrust claims in the two cases were somewhat different in that, in
Aimcee, Tomar sought the statutory remedy of damages, whereas in American
Safety Equipment, ASE sought simply to have the license agreement declared
invalid. In American Safety Equipment defendant-appellee Hickok sought to
distinguish ASE's claim on that basis as it attempted to show that the public
policy considerations were not relevant because ASE's antitrust claim arose
not out of a statutory right to damages, but out of a contract dispute as a
defense to a claim for royalties. Hickok, apparently admitting that a treble
damage claim would not be arbitrable, claimed that a successful treble damage
action required that it be proved that competition has been restrained and
that public interests had been adversely affected. Where the antitrust claim
was raised simply as a defense to a contract claim for the payment of royalties,
Hickok argued, the award would not affect any public rights or in any way
affect, much less restrain, competition." The court, in rejecting Hickok's
reasoning, stated: "We do not regard this distinction as significant if it is
meant to persuade us that arbitrators rather than courts should declare
whether contract provisions violate the Sherman Act?" 25
 ASE's declaratory
21 Greenstein v. National Skirt & Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
22 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1966).
23 Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 221 F. Supp. 364,
369 (D. La. 1963).
24 Brief for Appellee Hickok, supra note 9, at 22, 23.
25 391 F.2d at 827.
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judgment actions seeking that the agreement be declared invalid required the
resolution of the antitrust issues before the claim to royalties can be decided
and thus require the interpretation and application of antitrust policy. There-
fore, the court ruled that "the district court erred in submitting to the arbi-
trators 'the issue as to the validity' of the license agreement insofar as that
empowered the arbitrators to decide issues of antitrust law." 26 (Emphasis
added.)
The question whether matters of public policy should be placed in the
hands of arbitrators has arisen before. In Kingswood Management Corp. v.
Salzman27
 the parties had agreed to arbitrate the issue of the attorney's fee
incidental to a treble damage claim for rent overcharges under the Federal
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. The New York Appellate Division
refused to enforce the arbitration award, even though neither party had
resisted the arbitration, on the ground that, since the determination of the
attorney's fee was incidental to the determination of the action, its enforce-
ment would permit statutory public policy to be determined by arbitrators.
Thus, the result in the principal cases should not be surprising. Arbitration
is but a matter of contract28 and parties may agree to arbitrate any matter as
to which they may freely contract. But agreement to arbitrate matters of
public policy is another question. The reason is that arbitration is peculiarly
suited to its fundamental purpose: the prompt and economical solution of
private business disputes. In return for speed and economy the parties to an
arbitration must be willing to accept Iess certainty of a legally correct adjust-
ment of their private interests. 24 In line with the policy of preventing the
delays of court proceedings, arbitrators have authority to decide all legal as
well as factual issues that are necessary for the resolution of an arbitrable
dispute:3° But they are not bound by judicial precedents nor held strictly
to rules of law, nor are they required to apply the procedural and evidentiary
standards necessary for strict legal determinations that make court proceed-
ings protracted and expensive.31
 This policy of loose legal standards is justi-
fiable where only the private interests of the parties are involved. Parties may
certainly agree to such a compromise of their interests
[w] here the controversy concerns rights which the parties may by
agreement create, limit or define. . . . Where, on the other hand, the
power of the parties to create, limit or define their rights and legal
relations is restricted by law in the public interest, the parties cannot
by stipulation or agreement remove or loosen the restriction. 32
26
 Id. at 828.
27 272 App. Div. 328, 70 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1947).
28
 Local 1505, IBEW v. Local 1836, Machinists, 304 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1962)
29 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 438.
3 ° Continental Materials Corp. v. Gaddis Mining Co., 306 F.2d 952, 954 (10th Cir.
1962).
31
 See Marcy Lee Mfg. Co. v. Cortley Fabrics Co., 354 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1965) ;
Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961) ;
Petition of Dover S.S. Co., 143 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
32
 Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Movers Ass'n, 289 N.Y. 82, 89-90, 43
N.E.2d 820, 824 (1942).
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The primary concern in reserving antitrust claims to the courts is the
necessity of developing consistent antitrust standards. "Laws fare] a body
of precepts or rules. . One of the reasons for the promulgation of these
rules is the certainty of the guides so that one may know precisely to what
standards one will be subject." 33 The confusion of standards that might very
likely result from allowing arbitrators to interpret public policy unrestrained
by judicial precedents and the necessity of strict legal determinations would
seriously threaten the effectiveness of the laws enacted to promote such policy.
Arbitration awards might impose on parties to arbitration standards of
conduct much more or much less severe than those imposed as a matter
of public policy on others by the courts. Parties to an arbitration agreement
would have a very insecure foreknowledge of the standards by which they
should govern their conduct. In fact, they might very well seek to avoid
arbitration agreements for this very reason, to the discouragement of arbitra-
tion in the very fields in which it is desirable. The likelihood of differing
determinations, furthermore, is increased greatly in an area as notoriously
complex as antitrust litigation. A myriad of judicial precedents have been
necessary to establish standards for "unreasonable" restraints of trade and
per se violations of the antitrust laws. Judicial evidentiary standards and
extensive discovery procedures for the examination of the dealings of the
parties are vital to the determination of antitrust issues. These judicial
standards, however, are inapplicable and inappropriate to arbitration pro-
ceedings. It has been suggested that some accommodation of these standards
might be made within the arbitration proceedings. 34 But even if that were
an acceptable adjustment, the competence of the arbitrators, usually chosen
for their expertise in the business matters in dispute, hardly offers adequate
assurance of proper application of the standards. Consider, for example, the
difficulty where the federal antitrust claimant seeks to enforce his statutory
right to use a prior government judgment or decree as prima fade evidence
of his claim."
The determination of precisely what issues were adjudicated in the
antecedent government suit is no easy chore, even for judges with
backgrounds of legal experience who are presumably more skilled in
analyzing the scope and effect of pleadings, trial records, and judg-
ments. This type of complex legal analysis is out of place in an
arbitration proceeding, particularly if the arbitrator, as may be the
case, is not even a lawyer."
The principal cases illustrate this problem. In Aimcee the arbitration
panel was composed in part of two department store executives." In American
Safety Equipment ASE and Hickok had difficulty in agreeing on arbitrators
from lists submitted by the American Arbitration Association. ASE, the anti-
23 Kronstein, Arbitration Is Power, 38 N,Y.U.L. Rev. 661, 662 (1963).
34 See Farber, The Antitrust Claimant and Compulsory Arbitration Clauses, 28 Fed.
B.J. 90 (1468).
35 Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1464).
36 Farber, supra note 34, at 93.
37 Brief for Appellant at 19, Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tamar Prods., Inc., 21
N.V.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223, 289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
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trust claimant, crossed out the names of all who were not practicing lawyers
familiar with antitrust problems, but Hickok, the antitrust defendant, crossed
out all practicing lawyers familiar with antitrust and approved only those
who were businessmen or money lenders. 38 This possible lack of legal expertise
by the arbitrators is especially significant in light of the special danger pre-
sented by the antitrust claim in Aimcee. New York has no specific price
discrimination statute such as the federal Robinson-Patman Act, and the
question whether price discrimination, the basis of Tomar's claim, constituted
a violation of the Donnelly Act has never been decided by the courts." Thus
the arbitrators would have been required to make an unprecedented determina-
tion of the state's antitrust policy. It would appear conceivable that such a
determination could be totally at variance with the statutory scheme and
judicial guidelines.
These considerations do not establish that arbitrators' decisions will
necessarily contravene legislative and judicially established policies, but only
that they would seriously threaten antitrust policy because of the loose legal
standards of arbitration, the complexity of antitrust issues and the usual
lack of legal expertise of arbitrators. Also, it is important to note that the
opportunity for correction of errors is very limited. In a court proceeding
errors of law are open to close scrutiny and correction on appeal. On the
other hand, the decisions of arbitrators are essentially final and binding." The
merits of an award are not reviewable, and a court may not vacate or modify
an award because of disagreement with the arbitrators' interpretation of the
law or facts 4 1 It is not suggested that arbitrators may or are likely to disregard
the law. An arbitration award based on a "manifest disregard of the law"
will not be enforced. 42 This "manifest disregard," however, must appear clearly
on the face of the award," and arbitrators are not usually required to make a
complete record of the proceedings or even to give their reasons for their
decisions." In addition, in an area as complex as antitrust law a disregard of
the law is not likely to be manifest. It would thus appear unlikely that judicial
review of arbitration decisions would be effectual. Furthermore, extensive
judicial review of an arbitration award would just as effectively frustrate the
speedy and economical resolution of disputes as would the initial referral
29 Brief for Appellant at 10, American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.,
391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
2° Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tamar Prods., Inc,, 21 N.Y.2d at 629, 237 N.E.2d at
226-27, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
4 ° Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 436-37; James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger
Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 657 (1939).
Grounds for vacating or modifying an award under the United States Arbitration
Act are found in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1964). Grounds for vacating or modifying under the
New York Arbitration Law are found in N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 7511 (McKinney 1963).
41 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 436; Raytheon Co. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 322 F.2d 173,
182-83 (9th Cir. 1963) ; San Martine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Ter-
minals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 8C0 (9th Cir. 1961) ; James Richardson & Sons v. W.E. Hedger
Transp. Corp., 98 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1938), cert, denied, 305 U.S. 657 (1939).
42 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 436; San Martine Compania De Navegacion, S.A. v.
Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d at 801.
43 See John W. Daniel & Co. v. Janaf, inc., 169 F. Supp. 219, 224 (E.D. Va. 1958).
44 See Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 244 n.4 (1962); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
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of legal issues to the courts:* A party dissatisfied with an arbitration award
could tie up its enforcement indefinitely.
The dangers from independent determination of public policy by arbi-
trators is particularly apparent in the highly institutionalized arbitration
prevalent today." Industrial and trade organizations exercise a high degree
of regulation and control of arbitration within their own industries, and often
provide their own arbitration machinery. Many commercial contracts, includ-
ing form purchase orders, contain standard arbitration clauses of such orga-
nizations, calling for the use of their arbitration machinery. Others contain
standard clauses of the independent American Arbitration Association, which
has its own well-defined rules and procedures giving it a high degree of
control. In any case, since expertise in the business matters in dispute is a
criterion for selection of the arbitrators, there is a tendency to select arbi-
trators from within the area of industry involved. Such institutionalized
arbitration, free from judicial supervision, has considerable power to establish
and enforce separate and independent antitrust standards. 47 Arbitration insti-
tutions develop their own policies and standards which serve as guidelines
for later arbitrations. Although not bound by these precedents, arbitrators
affiliated with private interest groups are open to considerable pressure from
these groups. In addition, because of the natural wariness of industry in
general toward antitrust restrictions, the tendency would in all probability
run in the direction of weakening antitrust standards. It is not intended here
to criticize commercial arbitration operating within its proper sphere. It
serves as a legitimate instrument of business self-government. However, "[il t
is not an answer that the arbitrators are probably reasonable men, and will
probably do what is right between the parties. This question is one of power.
Sometimes arbitrators are unreasonable men or abuse power."48 Thus, side
by side with judicially determined antitrust standards, there might very well
develop several separate and independent standards controlled by private
interests. Ironically, the courts may then be called upon to enforce awards
made on the basis of these divergent standards.
This power of arbitration to avoid the strict legal requirements of statu-
tory antitrust policy also leads to a substantial danger of the use of arbitration
by parties seeking to insulate themselves from the full force of the antitrust
laws. The danger that commercial arbitration might be used to block the
implementation of legislation designed to safeguard public interests has been
foreseen:* Nowhere is this danger more clear than in the antitrust field. The
private antitrust action is designed primarily to protect the public interest
in a free, competitive economy and only secondarily and incidentally to corn-
46 Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967).
46 See Kronstein, supra note 33.
47
 Id. at 699.
48
 East India Trading Co. v. Halari, 305 N.Y. 866, 869, 114 N.E.2d 213, 214 (1953)
(dissenting opinion).
49
 "Commercial arbitration has been highly successful in bringing a businessman's
adjudication to business questions. But it would be vastly unfortunate if it became usable
as a device to blunt or break social legislation." Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d
Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
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pensate the injured party." The broad aim of statutory provisions for private
suits, therefore, is to supplement government action by using private self-
interest as a means for enforcement of the antitrust laws." The self-interest
of the federal antitrust claimant is fostered by liberal provisions in the
Clayton Act" favoring the claimant. He is given a wide choice of forum.53
The successful claimant recovers treble damages plus the cost of suit, includ-
ing reasonable attorney's fees. 54 In addition, to lessen the claimant's burden
in potentially complex and protracted litigation, any judgment or decree
received by the United States against an antitrust defendant shall be prima
facie evidence against that defendant in any private antitrust action brought
by any person against him." These provisions were primarily intended to
make it easier for the small claimant to bring suit." To permit the arbitration
of antitrust claims would be to move in a direction completely contrary to this
clear congressional purpose. An intended monopolist, being frequently in a
bargaining position superior to that of his customer and wishing to avoid the
stringent requirements of the antitrust laws, could protect himself by impos-
ing an arbitration agreement on his customer. The wide choice of forum
available to the claimant was intended to overcome the obstacle facing the
small claimant in the necessity of bringing suit in a distant forum." Yet very
frequently arbitration agreements specify the site of arbitration, and the
power of the stronger party to dictate the site would preclude the advantage
to the smaller party. The court in American Safety Equipment evidenced its
concern over this issue by stating: " [I] t. is also proper to ask whether con-
tracts of adhesion between alleged monopolists and their customers should
determine the forum for trying antitrust violations. Here again, we think
that Congress would hardly have intended that." 58 Furthermore, the treble
damages provision, which serves as an important incentive to the small
claimant and also as a strong enforcement tool, "would seem on its face
applicable only to lawsuits and not to arbitration proceedings." 59 It has been
held that antitrust treble damages are enforceable only in federal courts."
Thus it seems very likely that the stronger party could also evade this deter-
rent to his illegal conduct. In addition, the inhibition of the claimant because
of the unpredictability of the standards which he would meet in arbitration
is compounded by the loss of the treble damage incentive.
59 Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
51 Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947),
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 (1964).
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 22. This provision was more relevant in 1914 when the Clayton
Act was enacted and choice of forum was generally more restricted than today.
54 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
55 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
59 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
319 (1965).
57 See Eastland Constr. Co. v. Keasbey & Mattison Co., 358 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.
1966) ; West Virginia v. Morton Int'I, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D. Minn. 1967).
58 391 F.2d at 827.
59 Farber, supra note 34, at 93.
99 Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 198 (D. Del), aff'd, 110
F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 639 (1940).
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A further advantage to a party desiring to shield himself from the force
of the antitrust laws is the confidential nature of arbitration. This quality
serves to contravene directly the effect of private antitrust suits in exposing
violations and bringing them to the attention of the government and other
private parties. In fact, it serves to enhance what the court in Aimcee terms
the "clandestine" nature of antitrust violations." To provide better protection
of the public interest, New York added a statutory requirement in 1959 that
the State Attorney General be given notice of all civil actions brought under
the Donnelly Act.°2
 Whether this requirement applies to arbitration pro-
ceedings is at least open to question, as indicated by the fact that such notice
was not given in Aimcee. Nevertheless, if it is considered applicable, as the
court in Aimcee points out, "it is inconceivable that the Attorney General
would seek to vindicate the public interest before a private arbitration
panel."63
It is not only in the situation of unequal bargaining positions that this
danger of insulation from the force of the antitrust laws is apparent. Business-
men dealing at arm's length might very well desire to shield their dealings
from the full impact of the antitrust laws and from public scrutiny, and can
do so to a large extent by the simple expedient of agreeing to arbitration.
The court in Aimcee was aware of both situations when it stated:
Mt must be recognized that through the use of economic power
and contracts of adhesion, containing broad arbitration clauses,
antitrust violators may be able to insulate their transgressions of the
antitrust law from judicial scrutiny. The opportunity for abuse is
apparent. Under various guises, an industry, while nominally assur-
ing obedience to the State's antitrust law, may in reality be establish-
ing and enforcing entirely unacceptable practices."
The suggested alternative solution of requiring arbitrators to give full
effect to the statutory requirements where statutory public policy is involved
is doubtlessly feasible.65
 Requiring arbitrators to give effect to the antitrust
claimant's choice of location would not violate arbitration policy. The purpose
in allowing prior government decrees as prima facie evidence to lessen the
burden of private claimants is actually in harmony with the policy behind
arbitration to provide economical and swift settlements of disputes. Nor
would it be inconsistent with arbitration policy to require arbitrators to give
effect to the treble damage and cost provisions. In addition, requirements of
notice, such as the New York provision, could easily be made applicable to
arbitration proceedings. The question, however, remains one of suitability.
What adjustment will best serve to implement the policies underlying antitrust
enforcement and commercial arbitration? Even if arbitrators were to give full
effect to the requirements of the antitrust laws, this practice would not alle-
viate the problems of giving effect to prior government decrees and interpreting
61 21 N.Y.2d at 625, 237 N.E.2d at 224, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
62 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340(5) (McKinney 2968).
63 21 N.Y.2d at 627, 237 N.E.2d at 226, 289 N.Y.S,2d at 972.
64 Id. at 629, 237 N.E.2d at 227, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 973-74.
0 5 Farber, supra note 34, at 92-93.
416
ARBITRATION AND ANTITRUST
judicial antitrust precedents. With the finality of arbitration awards there
is no means to review the arbitrators' understanding of problems of burden
of proof and evidentiary requirements.'''' In addition, the basic approach taken
to a dispute by arbitrators may have an adverse effect upon antitrust enforce-
ment. In this regard, the court in Aimcee stated:
[Wle cannot overlook the fact that many undeserving litigants are
awarded damages in antitrust cases. Arbitrators are more likely to
give more consideration to equitable notions such as waiver, estoppel
and in pars delicto. Every time this is done, however, the deterrent
effect of the law on antitrust violations is severely diminished. 67
For these reasons it would appear that the suggested solution of accom-
modating arbitration procedures to the requirements of the antitrust laws
offers inadequate assurance that arbitration will meet the standards essential
to antitrust enforcement.
It must be noted that the decision to reserve antitrust issues to the
courts, though supported by the desire to preserve the effectiveness of anti-
trust enforcement and judicial development of substantive antitrust law,
would also appear important to the preservation of the effectiveness of arbi-
tration. As noted previously, in some circumstances the uncertainty of
standards in arbitration might deter the use of arbitration even within its
proper sphere. In addition, extensive discovery procedures and the strict
legal determination of antitrust issues would undo the speed and economy of
arbitration. One of the dangers to arbitration is the possibility that frivolous
antitrust claims will be interjected by a party in a weak position on the
initial business issues in order to confuse and cloud the original issues. Such
insubstantial claims might also be raised to delay arbitration. Nevertheless,
even though these claims would have to be referred to the courts, the courts
are far more competent to determine quickly their lack of merit. Thus the
assignment of the antitrust issues to the courts would result in a more efficient
determination of their merit while it would leave the arbitration process free of
retarding antitrust complexity. This division of labor would appear far prefer-
able to an attempt to resolve both antitrust and normally arbitrable questions
totally by the arbitration process. The latter arrangement would fail of both
the consistent enforcement of antitrust law and of the speed and economy
sought through arbitration.
In one sense arbitration of antitrust issues would seem to support anti-
trust enforcement by offering a less expensive forum for the small claimant
whose prospects of success are such that he would be unwilling to undertake
the expense of a court suit. An immediate answer to this argument is the
objection that the advantage of economy by arbitration would be lost by
the introduction of the antitrust claims. More importantly, the necessity of
consistent interpretation of antitrust policy overrides any additional incen-
tive that might be provided for such a claimant. Though it would seem un-
likely that it could be determined prior to the arbitration proceeding which
party would fare better, logically the party with the weaker legal position
66 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 436.
67 21 N.Y.2d at 629, 237 N.E.2d at 227, 289 N.V.S.2d at 973.
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would seek arbitration and the other party would resist it. Even if it is
the claimant who insists on arbitration, however, it must be noted that
the antitrust defendant has an equally strong interest in the legal safeguards
of judicial proceedings. As mentioned earlier, he might very likely be sub-
jected to standards much more or less severe than those imposed as a matter
of public policy on others by the courts. Indeed, he might be confronted with
the very real dilemma of two separate and divergent standards, one in arbi-
tration and one in court.
This belief that the policy considerations are determinative in whatever
context the antitrust issues arise and regardless of which party raises them was
underscored by the court in Aimcee:
The fundamental issue here is the appropriateness of arbitration for
the consideration of antitrust problems. This question persists no
matter in what procedural context the issue arises in arbitration. Our
decision cannot properly turn on the happenstance of who initiates
the litigation or arbitration."
In American Safety Equipment the court made the statement that "we do
not deal here with an agreement to arbitrate made after a controversy has
already arisen."" This language would seem to suggest that the parties might
agree to arbitrate after a dispute involving antitrust issues arose. However,
the court went on to state that it did not think that disputes involving anti-
trust issues were among those situations where "Congress has allowed parties
to obtain the advantages of arbitration."" This view seems clearly to preclude
even the situation where both parties agree to arbitrate.
III. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the potential impact on antitrust enforcement from ar-
bitral determination of antitrust issues raises again the initial question
whether the public interest justifies the blanket rule laid down by the
courts in American Safety Equipment and Aimcee. In American Safety Equip-
ment appellee Hickok claimed " [t]here is no evidence of any kind that the
public has been damaged or that competition has been restrained." 71 This
contention would seem to beg the question. If the license agreement violated
the antitrust laws, then there was a public injury. Any unreasonable restraint
of trade is in itself injurious to the public in general. The potential magnitude
of public injury is described by the court in American Safety Equipment:
Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands—perhaps mil-
lions—of people and inflict staggering economic damage. Thus, in
the recent "electrical equipment" cases, there were over 1,900
actions, including over 25,000 separate damage claims, commenced
by purchasers of equipment allegedly illegally overpriced. The pur-
°8 Id. at 625, 237 N.E.2d at 224, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
no 391 F.2d at 827.
7() Id. at 828.
71 Brief for Appellee Hickok, supra note 9, at 23.
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chasers in turn sold electricity to millions of consumers at rates pre-
sumably increased by the excessive costs. 72
The principal cases did not involve claims which suggested public injury of
such magnitude. But, as the Court of Appeals noted in American Safety
Equipment, a rule governing the arbitrability of antitrust claims must take
into account its own potential effect." At the very least, the resolution of any
antitrust claim involves something more than the interests of the private
parties involved. The results of erroneous decisions by arbitrators of solely
private claims, as opposed to antitrust claims, are very different. The Aimcee
court observed:
If the arbitrators here should decide wrongly that the goods were or
were not defective, the injustice done is essentially only to the
parties concerned. If, however, they should proceed to decide erro-
neously that there was or was not a violation of the Donnelly Act,
the injury extends to the people of the State as a whole. To illus-
trate, if Tomar is correct in its claim that the rebate here violates the
Donnelly Act, and the arbitration panel should deny the claim, then
in effect the arbitrators have permitted Aimcee to receive an un-
justifiable price reduction which weakens the position of Aimcee's
competitors. Conversely, if Tomar is incorrect in its contention,
but the arbitrators should rule in its favor, then the award may be
passed on to the consumer in the form of higher prices. 74
Thus erroneous findings of antitrust violations are as contrary to the public
interest as non-enforcement. Legitimate compacts for solid business reasons
are economically efficient, as they tend to reduce costs and thereby to lower
prices. Since only "unreasonable" restraints of trade are against public policy,
to restrain legitimate practices is as deleterious to free competition as are
antitrust violations. The "compelling interest in having a uniform and con-
sistent interpretation"75 of the antitrust laws weighs equally against too
severe or too lenient interpretations of the laws.
Two statutory policies of major importance on the national and state
levels appear to he in conflict in the principal cases. The decisions suggest a
resurgence of judicial hostility to commercial arbitration. There is present
the same concern about surrender by the courts of their jurisdiction over
matters of public policy. But this concern seems to be a legitimate one in
some circumstances. It is possible to reconcile the procedures of arbitration
and the requirements of antitrust enforcement, but the cost to the effective-
ness of both leads to the conclusion that such a reconciliation is far from
desirable. From a policy standpoint the decisions in the principal cases would
seem to offer the best solution in the interests of antitrust enforcement and
of effective arbitration in dealing with those business matters within its in-
tended sphere. The courts alone can provide adequate legal safeguards for the
72 391 F.2d at 826-27.
73 Id. at 827.
74 21 N.Y.2d at 627, 237 N.E.2d at 225, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 971-72.
75 Farber, supra note 34, at 94.
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public interest in antitrust claims, and private arbitration is best suited for
dealing with private business matters expeditiously. The courts are in a better
position to determine the substantive merit of antitrust claims. If the claims
have merit, the courts are the competent and most efficient forum for resolving
them so that arbitration may proceed on other arbitrable issues. If the courts
determine the claims to be frivolous, arbitration may proceed to decide the
relevant issues unhampered by the antitrust issues. This solution does not dis-
parage the arbitration process. Rather it seeks to confine that procedure to
the manageable task of everyday settlement of practical business problems."
JOHN J. FINN
76 See 21 N.Y.2d at 630, 237 N.E.2d at 227, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
420
